ABSTRACT In this paper, we address the issue of security-concerned user association in two-tier heterogeneous cellular networks with in-band interference. Different from the maximum secrecy capacity association (max-SC), which studied multi-tier heterogeneous networks without in-band interference, we consider the max-SC problem with in-band interference. Considering the intractability of the max-SC scheme under in-band interference scenario, we derive a simplified max-SC scheme based on the Maclaurin formulation. Network connection and secrecy probability, as well as network secrecy throughput, are analyzed under our association scheme through stochastic geometry. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can approach the performance of the max-SC association, in terms of secrecy probability and network secrecy throughput, and performs better in terms of connection probability. Comparing with the previous work, the proposed scheme performs better in connection, secrecy probability, and secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
Heterogeneous cellular network, consisting of Base Stations (BS) of different tiers, provides fast, flexible, effective and efficient expansion for existing cellular network to meet the increasing requirement for network resource. In the HCNs, high-power cellular BS provides wide and public access, while low-power BS helps to offload massive data from the cellular BS and expands the cellular coverage [1] . User association in Hetnets, which determines whether a user equipment (UE) is associated with a particular base station before data transmission, plays a pivotal role in enhancing network performance [2] . User association scheme is carefully designed to meet different demands, such as load balancing [3] , spectrum efficiency [4] , and energy efficiency [5] . Among these demands, the issue of security is put forward to achieve better network secrecy performance.
The security issue is raised because of the broadcast nature of wireless transmission medium, which leads to potential malicious attack of eavesdropper. Contemporary communication system is mostly based on cryptographic approach to guarantee secrecy, which is rooted on the unacceptability of computational complexity. Unlike the cryptographic approach, using the inherent randomness of the wireless channel and the difference between the legitimate UE and eavesdropper channels, physical layer security (PLS) has been proven to achieve the strictest notion of security [6] . The theoretic basis of physical layer security was laid by Wyner [7] and later by Csiszár and Körner [8] . Physical layer security performance has been an important measurement in specific security-concerned communication systems. Fruitful results have been achieved to enhance physical layer security performance in cooperative channel [9] , [10] , twoway channel [11] , [12] , Ad-hoc networks [13] , [14] , cellular networks [15] and heterogeneous networks [16] . For the issue of security-concerned user association under the HCN, [16] analyzed the secrecy performance when the traditional maximum received signal strength (max-RSS) association is used. Reference [17] examined the network secrecy performance during uplink phase under the max-RSS scheme. To further improve network secrecy performance, Wu et al. [18] derived the secrecy capacity during the downlink phase when the BS providing the largest secrecy capacity (the max-SC scheme) is selected. However, in [18] , only high-SNR scenario is considered and in-band interference is beyond the scope. In fact, in-band interference factor becomes inevitable during user association, as a result of denser Hetnet deployment and aggressive frequency reuse. The max-RSS and max-SC user association schemes were also considered in [15] under single-tier cellular networks, in which small-scale fading factor and in-band interference were beyond the scope. Note that when heterogeneous interference is considered in the max-SC association, the analysis upon network performance becomes rather complex if it is not impossible. This motivates us to develop a tractable and simplified max-SC scheme under the HCN with in-band interference.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. On one hand, we propose the max-SC scheme under the two-tier HCN with in-band interference. Considering the high complexity of the scheme, we put forward a simplified max-SC scheme using the Maclaurin formulation. On the other hand, we derive the connection probability, secrecy probability, and network secrecy throughput of the simplified scheme.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We focus on a two-tier HCN during downlink phase. Define K = {1, 2} as all the BS tiers. Without loss of generality, tier-1 denotes the Macro Base Station (MBS) with high transmit power, and tier-2 denotes the Pico Base Station (PBS) with low transmit power. The locations of tier-1, tier-2 BSs, UEs and eavesdroppers, are assumed to be scattered as the independent 2-D homogeneous Poisson Point Process (HPPP) 1 , 2 , u and e , with densities λ 1 , λ 2 , λ u and λ e .
A. CHANNEL MODEL AND FIXED TRANSMIT POWER
Both standard power loss propagation model with path loss coefficient α and the Rayleigh fading model are assumed in the paper. Thus, signal power received by a UE from a tier-t BS can be expressed as P r = P t |h| 2 z −α , where z denotes the distance between the BS and UE, and h is the channel gain satisfying the exponent distribution |h| 2 ∼ exp (1) . Transmit power of tier-t BSs is fixed as P t .
B. FREQUENCY REUSE AND INTERFERENCE
In this paper, universal frequency reuse is adopted among all tiers, and all BSs share the same frequency band [16] , [17] . Thus, for both legitimate and eavesdropping links, the UEs and eavesdroppers will experience interference from all the BSs, as depicted in Fig.1 . Each BS allocates the frequency resource equally to its serving UEs (TDMA mode), thus no in-band interference exists between UEs in the same cell.
C. EAVESDROPPING MODEL
It is assumed that eavesdroppers are also users of the existing network, and each BS has the channel state information (CSI) of legitimate UEs and eavesdroppers. Non-colluding eavesdroppers are assumed in this paper. And we only consider the closest the eavesdropper for each BS (for downlink phase), because the nearest eavesdropper has the largest received signal strength in a high probability [22] .
Other notations are summarized in the Table 1 . 
III. USER ASSOCIATION
It is impractical for a UE to search all BSs for optimal association, thus [16] , [18] proposed that the averaged received signal strength from the candidate BS should be above a threshold as
where τ denotes the received power threshold. Therefore, candidate tier-t BSs must be located in the circle region , which can be expanded by Maclaurin formulation as
Take the one-order term and we put forward the following user association scheme to be an approximation of (2) (t, i)
We stress that eq. (4) can approach eq.(2) through selecting optimal β t . Note that larger β t leads more UEs to connect with tier-t BSs, thus β t can be viewed as the bias value to tier-t BS. The optimal β t is difficult to derive analytically, while it can be derived using linear search method. In part IV, network performance of the proposed scheme (4) 1 is derived analytically. In part V, theoretical results in part IV are verified through Monto Carlo simulations, which are compared with scheme (2) and the scheme proposed by [18] .
IV. CONNECTION, SECRECY AND SECRECY THROUGHPUT PERFORMANCE
In this section, we consider a typical UE located at origin o for the ergodicity of PPP described in Slivnyak's Theorem [19] . The connection probability P c of our proposed simplified max-SC scheme, which defines the probability that legitimate channel can support the data rate R t , is given by [16] 
where C l denotes the capacity of legitimate channel. Secrecy probability P s , which defines the probability that the eavesdropping channel cannot support the redundant data rate R e , is given by [16] P s = P{C e < R e }
where C e denotes the capacity of eavesdropping channel. The secrecy throughput is given by
where the secrecy throughput gives the secrecy and reliability tradeoff (SRT) performance [23] , and defines the data rate which can be correctly transmitted without being eavesdropped.
A. CONNECTION PROBABILITY
We extend the connection probability of the typical UE in eq.(5) using the Total Probability Formula as follows
where A t denotes the probability that the typical UE is associated with a tier-t BS. f z|t (z|t) denotes the conditional PDF of the legitimate link distance (denoted as z) conditioned on the typical UE associated with a tier-t BS, and f z,t (z, t) denotes the joint PDF of the legitimate link distance equaling z and the typical UE associated with a tier-t BS.
Step (a) follows the total probability formula, and step (b)
It should be emphasized that the joint PDF f z,t (z, t) is quite different from previous works, because of different user association schemes. For the purpose of readability, f z,t (z, t) is derived in Appendix A. The probability P W t log 2 (1 +
where step (a) follows from the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of exponent distribution. The step (b) follows the Laplace transform, when define
where h k,i and y k,i denote the channel gain and distance between the typical UE and the ith interfering BS of tier-k, respectively.
Step (a) follows the PGFL in [20] , and step (b) is obtained through the MGF of the Rayleigh distribution. Compared with (59) in [21] , eq.(10) in this paper is obtained by integrating y from 0 to +∞, which is caused by the fact that the interfering BSs can be arbitrarily near to the typical UE. λ k (y) in (10) denotes the interfering BS density at a distance y away from the typical UE. Most previous works associate the typical UE with the nearest BS, resulting that the interfering tier-k BSs are uniformly distributed beyond the circle area B k (0, ( [16] , where z denotes the distance between the typical UE and the serving tier-t BS. When the typical UE uses the proposed scheme (4) for BS association, the resulting distribution of interfering BS locations will be quite different from the previous works. On one hand, assuming the typical UE is associated with a tier-t BS, there may exists interfering tier-k BS in the circle area B(0, (
α z) as long as its corresponding eavesdropping link distance is small enough. On the other hand, the interfering BSs outside the area B(0, (
α z) are no longer uniformly distributed as well. In this paper, we use a weighted density function λ k (y) (in polar coordinates) to formulate the density of the interfering tier-k BSs, where y denotes the distance to the typical UE.
Lemma 1: Under the situation where the eavesdropper's density is large enough, assuming the typical UE is associated with a tier-t BS, the density of the tier-k interfering BSs (in polar coordinates) is given by
where z is the legitimate link distance between the typical UE and the associated BS, and λ k denotes the density of tier-k BSs in rectangular coordinates. Proof : As depicted in Fig.2 , z, y, z e and z e denote distances of legitimate link, interfering link, typical UE's and interfering BS's eavesdropping link, respectively. Once the typical UE decides to connect to a tier-t BS, the weighted interfering and eavesdropping link ratio
of a random interfering tier-k BS at distance y is larger than ratio 1 β t z z e of the associated BS, according to eq.(4). When the eavesdropper's density is large enough, all the eavesdropping links of interfering BSs can be regarded to be independent. As a result, density of interfering tier-k BSs at a distance y (denoted as λ k (y)) will be proportional to the probability P{ 
}.
Considering the density of uniformly distributed interfering BSs under polar coordinates is λ k (y) = 2π λ k y, the resulting interfering BSs' density after association can be written as 
where step (a) follows the fact that the eavesdropping links z e and z e are independent, and both of which satisfy [19] f z e (d) = 2π λ e de
Thus, eq.(10) becomes
Combining with f z,t (z, t) derived in Appendix A, we give the connection probability of the typical UE in the following Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The connection probability of the typical UE is given by eq. (8), (14) and f z,t (z, t) given by eq.(29).
B. SECRECY PROBABILITY
We extend the secrecy probability of the typical UE in eq.(6) using the Total Probability Formula as 38610 VOLUME 6, 2018 follows. 
where s e = − 2
Step (a) follows [25] .
Thus, the secrecy probability of the typical UE can be given the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy probability of a typical UE is given by (18) , as shown at the bottom of the next page, where F z k z e,k (x) is defined by (21) and s e = − 2
The Theorem 2 can be obtained by combining eq. (16), (17) and f z e ,t (z e , t) given by eq.(33).
C. SECRECY THROUGHPUT
In the following theorem, we obtain the secrecy throughput analysis of the proposed user association. Similar definition is used in [23] , where the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) P{C l R t , C e < R e } is derived. Considering the independence between legitimate and eavesdropping channels in [23] , the SRT analysis of [23] can be simplified as P{C l R t , C e < R e } = P{C l R t } · P{C e < R e } = P c (R t )P s (R e ). However, the legitimate and eavesdropping channels are not independent as a result of association scheme (4). Thus, the equation P{C l R t , C e < R e } = P c (R t )P s (R e ) will not hold. We give the secrecy throughput (R t , R e ) in the following theorem. (15), (18) and (19) contain at least two integral operations, it is actually easy to calculate. These equations provide tractable expressions for network connection and secrecy performance analysis, which requires no time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, the analytical expressions of connection probability, secrecy probability and secrecy throughput are validated through Monte Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo simulation is done over 50000 snapshots of different spatial topologies. The simulation parameters are set as α = 3, τ = −50dBm, λ u = 2.5 nodes/(π 500 2 ). It is assumed that tier-1 BSs have higher transmit power and lower density, while tier-2 BSs have lower transmit power and higher density. Thus, tier-1 BSs can be macro BSs (MBS) and tier-2 BSs can be pico BSs (PBS) or femto BSs (FBS). Other simulation parameters are given in the table 2. We use scheme (4) as an approximation of scheme (2), thus we compare the connection and secrecy performance of scheme (2) and (4) in this section. Performance curves of scheme (2) are only derived through Monte Carlo simulations, because of the high complexity of theoretical manipulations. β t used by scheme (4) is derived through exhaustive searching with accuracy equaling 0.1. We also compare the scheme (4) with [18] , which assumed no in-band interference. Although the scheme proposed by [18] is not analyzed under the scenario of in-band interference, [18] can be regarded
VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 3. The effect of BS density on connection probability. The theoretic value of [18] is obtained by setting β t = 1 for arbitrary t in eq. (15) .
as a special case of scheme (4) by setting β t = 1 for arbitrary t. Hence, the theoretic value of [18] is obtained through setting β t = 1 in eq. (15), (18) and (19) . In the following figures, square, upper-triangle and lower-triangle marks depict the simulation results of the performances achieved by scheme (2), scheme (4) and scheme proposed by [18] respectively. The solid and solid-dot lines depict the theoretical results of scheme (4) and that proposed by [18] . The blue and black colors differentiate the scenarios when λ 1 = 0.2λ u and λ 1 = 0.4λ u . Fig.3 demonstrates the effect of BS density upon user connection probability. It can be observed that the theoretic connection probability given by eq.(15) are in quite good agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results of eq.(4). The proposed scheme given by eq.(4) performs better than both the max-SC scheme (2) and the scheme in [18] in view of connection performance. Connection probability decreases with denser BS deployment. This trend is quite different FIGURE 4. The effect of BS density on secrecy probability. The theoretic value of [18] is obtained by setting β t = 1 for arbitrary t in eq.(18).
FIGURE 5.
The effect of BS density on secrecy throughput. The theoretic value of [18] is obtained by setting β t = 1 for arbitrary t in eq. (19) .
from the previous works [27] , in which connection probability remains unchanged with different BS densities. This phenomenon reveals that although denser BS deployment 
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provides more candidate BSs for association, the increasing interference strength has more influences on connection performance under the proposed scheme. Fig.4 and Fig.5 demonstrate the effects of BS density upon user secrecy probability and secrecy throughput. It can be observed that the theoretic results given by eq.(18) and eq. (19) are in quite good agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results of eq.(4). The proposed scheme given by eq.(4) can effectively approach the max-SC scheme (2) in view of secrecy and secrecy throughput performances, and performs better than [18] . Secrecy probability and secrecy throughput increase with the increasing densities of both high-power and low-power BSs. This trend indicates that although more BSs decrease the connection probability, secrecy probability and secrecy throughput are promoted.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper comprehensively studies the maximum secrecy capacity association under two-tier HCNs with in-band interference. Considering the untractability of the conventional scheme, we propose a simplified scheme. Analytical expressions of the network connection, secrecy probability and secrecy throughput are derived, which are validated through Monte Carlo simulations. Simulations are done under different BS density settings, which will be helpful for future network design and deployment. 
